The field of AI is undergoing a fundamental transition from systems that can produce synthetic content upon request to autonomous agents that can plan and execute complex tasks with only limited human involvement. Companies that pioneered the development of generative AI tools are now building AI agents that can be instructed to independently navigate the internet, perform a wide range of online tasks, and serve as artificial personal assistants and virtual coworkers. The opportunities presented by this new technology are tremendous, as are the associated risks. Fortunately, there exist robust analytic frameworks for confronting many of these challenges, namely, the economic theory of principal-agent problems and the common law doctrine of agency relationships. Drawing on these frameworks, this Article makes three contributions. First, it uses agency law and theory to identify and characterize problems arising from AI agents, including issues of information asymmetry, discretionary authority, and loyalty. Second, it illustrates the limitations of conventional solutions to agency problems: incentive design, monitoring, and enforcement might not be effective for governing AI agents that make uninterpretable decisions and operate at unprecedented speed and scale. Third, the Article explores the implications of agency law and theory for designing and regulating AI agents, arguing that new technical and legal infrastructure is needed to support governance principles of inclusivity, visibility, and liability.

As one of the most enduring metaphors within legal discourse, the marketplace of ideas has wielded considerable influence over the jurisprudential landscape for decades. A century after the inception of this theory, ChatGPT emerged as a revolutionary technological advancement in the twenty-first century. This research finds that ChatGPT effectively manifests the marketplace metaphor. It not only instantiates the promises envisaged by generations of legal scholars but also lays bare the perils discerned through sustained academic critique. Specifically, the workings of ChatGPT and the marketplace of ideas theory exhibit at least four common features: arena, means, objectives, and flaws. These shared attributes are sufficient to render ChatGPT historically the most qualified engine for actualizing the marketplace of ideas theory. The comparison of the marketplace theory and ChatGPT merely marks a starting point. A more meaningful undertaking entails reevaluating and reframing both internal and external AI policies by referring to the accumulated experience, insights, and suggestions researchers have raised to fix the marketplace theory. Here, a pivotal issue is: should truth-seeking be set as the goal of AI content governance? Given the unattainability of the absolute truth-seeking goal, I argue against adopting zero-risk policies. Instead, a more judicious approach would be to embrace a knowledge-based alternative wherein large language models (LLMs) are trained to generate competing and divergent viewpoints based on sufficient justifications. This research also argues that so-called AI content risks are not created by AI companies but are inherent in the entire information ecosystem. Thus, the burden of managing these risks should be distributed among different social actors, rather than being solely shouldered by chatbot companies.